ABSTRACT: Is development uniquely modern? Economists and political scientists define development in terms of features that are unique to modernity, such as high GDP growth, liberalism, and centralization. In this paper, we deploy the case of ancient Athens as an existential counter to these theories. Moving from CNWW's definition of development as the transition from 'natural state' to 'open access,' we contend that the ancient polis of Athens was, in many relevant respects, 'developed.' The development path followed by ancient Athens illustrates how development requires, at a minimum, a) security against arbitrary acts of violence and b) predictability, provided by reasonably fair rules and their reasonably impartial application and reliable enforcement. As in modern liberal democracies, in Athens these institutions were associated with sustained growth in state capacity and in per capita consumption. Our definition highlights intuitive requirements of development that existing definitions fail to stress. Moreover, our definition suggests, empirically, that development does not depend on a set of specific institutions that have been hard to establish, let alone consolidate, in modern developing countries.
Introduction
Is development a uniquely modern phenomenon? We know that some ancient rulers were wealthy and powerful. Other ancient states featured sophisticated systems of law and collective self-government by citizens. But were any of these ancient states developed? Current models of development do not provide an answer to this question.
Economists and political scientists agree that development requires one (or more) the following features: a level of GDP growth uniquely found in modernity (e.g. North and Thomas, 1973; Barro, 1998; Acemoglu, 2009) , some form of liberal democracy (e.g. Fukuyama, 1992; Diamond, 2008) and a strongly centralized government (Hobbes, 1651; Tilly, 1992; Fukuyama, 2011; Morris, 2014; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) .
Existing definitions of development are thus grounded on a circular logic: predicating development on conditions unique to modernity, such definitions imply that development must be uniquely modern. As a corollary, all pre-modern states must be regarded as undeveloped.
In this paper, we provide a minimalist definition of development that avoids the circular logic of modern theories of development by drawing on a wider range of empirical evidence. Weakening the definitional requirements that have obscured the phenomenon of pre-modern development, our approach captures intuitively relevant distinctions among pre-modern states, as well as intuitively relevant similarities between certain pre-modern and certain modern states.
To understand development, we draw on the theory developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) , and Cox, North, and Weingast (2012) . For the authors an open access society-that is, a developed society-is characterized by impersonal, perpetual, and inclusive political and economic institutions. Conversely, limited access, "natural state" institutions lack these features. "Development" is the transition from a limited access, natural states, to an open access order. The transition involves attaining three "doorstep conditions:" i.e., rule of law for elites, perpetuity for the state and other organizations, and consolidated political control over the sources of violence.
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The CNWW framework differs from the approaches taken by those who reduce development to modernity, liberalism, or centralization because it analyzes development not in terms of outcomes, but in terms of processes that create the capacity to sustain impersonality, perpetuity and inclusion. However, CNWW's framework resembles these approaches in that the authors rely solely on modern cases as evidence and illustrations.
Resorting to a limited historical sample raises a basic problem of causation: if development is strictly a modern phenomenon, then could some other condition (or set of conditions) unique to modernity, but not emphasized by the theory, be the actual cause of development? If so, the association between open access political and economic institutions and development is spurious.
Our paper therefore raises a second question: is the open access order uniquely modern? To answer this question, we show that conditions similar to those that CNWW assert for modern Europe held in ancient Athens. This demonstration, in turn, yields two immediate conclusions: first, the hypothesis that open access is uniquely a product of modernity is false; second, the case of Athens provides additional validation for the CNWW framework.
In this paper, we argue that classical Athens was developed in CNWW's terms: that is, Athens built impersonal, perpetual, and inclusive institutions, despite being premodern, hardly liberal, and loosely centralized. Analyzing the emergence and evolution of Athens' institutions, we identify the minima that constitute our definition of development: a) personal and property security against arbitrary acts of violence carried out by members of the executive and private citizens alike; and b) stability and predictability, provided by reasonably fair rules and their reasonably impartial application and reliable enforcement. These conditions were associated with sustained growth in state capacity and in per capita consumption.
The major implication of our approach is that if development qua open access is not uniquely modern, then theories of development that focus uniquely on modern development are likely to produce partial explanations. Our approach challenges current theories of development by systematically testing widely-accepted hypotheses: for our purposes, Athens serves as an existential counter to three different, yet interdependent theories that define development in terms of modernity, liberal democracy, and centralization.
Our theoretical challenge has profound practical implications: approaches to development that require high levels of GDP growth, liberal democratic institutions, and strong central governments, have proven hard to implement and/or consolidate in developing countries -countries that experienced extremely different social, economic and political histories from those of early modern European states, where democracy has not arisen organically, and where a functioning centralized state has long been, and still is, the exception. The view from Athens suggests that high GDP growth, modern liberal democratic institutions, and highly centralized governments are one path, but by no means the only path, to development. By showing that conventional hypotheses about development are too narrowly framed and, most crucially, largely inapplicable to the developing world, we hope to open a debate on alternative approaches to development. Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the CNWW framework. Section 3 follows with an introduction to ancient Athens. Section 4 shows that Athens met the "doorstep conditions," while section 5 illustrates the extent to which Athens went beyond the doorstep conditions and transitioned to an open access society proper. In section 6, we explain the transition to open access in ancient Athens in terms of two-interrelated political and economic conditions. Our conclusions follow. Data in CNW reveal the frequency with which even the richest developing countries experience episodes of violence. 5 Understanding development requires taking into account not just the prevalence of violence, but also the frequency of shocks to the established order (Rodrick 1999) . The first feature involves statics that produce a stable equilibrium at a moment in time. The second feature involves dynamics, or change over time, and provides an explanation for why developing countries regularly experience violence. We consider these problems in turn.
The CNWW Framework
To create order and limit violence, natural states structure the polity and economy in ways that induce the powerful -i.e., those with violence potential -to cooperate rather 3 Previous scholarship emphasizes the importance of violence in the process of state building (particularly, Tilly 1992 and Bates 2001) , but systematically fails to appreciate the problem of distributed violence that drives the logic of the natural state. 4 North, Wallis, Webb, and Weingast (2012) apply this approach by studying a range of different types of natural states, suggesting how some become more sophisticated, and prosperous, than others. 5 For CNW, the frequency of violent regime change in the developing world -once every seven to eight years -is sufficiently high that developing countries structure their political and economic institutions to lower the probability of violence. Were they to fail to do so, the frequency of violence would be even higher.
than fight. They do so through rent-creation: powerful individuals and groups cooperate by limiting access to rent-producing organizations in the polity and in the economy. Second, all states experience shocks or shifts in "relative prices" broadly conceived (North 1981; 1990) . As a result of shocks, different groups with violence potential are differentially affected: for example, technological or demographic change may advantage one group disproportionately; or the discovery of minerals or trade shocks may advantage other groups. As one group (or set of groups) becomes more powerful, its relative violence potential increases, and it is likely to demand a greater share of the rents. This demand surge creates a bargaining problem among the powerful groups.
To maintain order in the face of shocks, powerful groups must adjust the distribution of rents to reflect the new distribution of power. However, several problems plague successful bargaining, including those of commitment and asymmetric information (Fearon 1995; Powell 1999 
Athens in the Ancient Greek world
The Greek world (henceforth, "Hellas") in the 4 th century BCE -the age of Plato, Aristotle, and Demosthenes -was exceptional among pre-modern societies. Hellas was an extensive culture zone, made up of ca. 1000 independent (or quasi-independent) citystates (Hansen and Nielsen 2004) . These states shared a language and other cultural attributes, including religion and ways of war. Although a number of city-states organized themselves into federal leagues (Mackil 2013) , few had an overarching sovereign or a singular, centralized political authority. Between 800 and 300 BCE the Greek world experienced five centuries of unprecedentedly high (aggregate and per capita) economic growth, at least by pre-modern standards (Morris 2004; Ober 2010b; 2015a) . The population (ca. 7-10m persons) was comparatively dense (well in excess of agricultural carrying capacity, at least in central Greece), highly urbanized (ca. 30% of population living in towns of 5000 or more), and healthy -based on average age at death of adults (Hansen 2006; Morris 2004; Ober 2010b; 2015a: ch. 4) . The world of the citystates was also highly competitive: failure in inter-state competition led to loss of autonomy and, albeit in rare cases, even extermination (Ober 2008) . At the same time, the common language and culture facilitated transfer of goods, ideas, information, institutions, and technologies. Finally, the Greek world experienced a high level of trade and political interaction not only among the city-states, but also between the city-states and non-Greek societies of Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Athens stands out in the Greek world. Athens was a very large city-state of ca.
2500 km 2 with a population of ca. 250,000, and, by various measures, the highest performing of the Greek city-states from the early 5 th to the later 4 th century BCE (Ober 2008, ch. 2) . Beginning in the late 6 th century, and with only brief interruptions (in 411/0, and again in 404/3), Athens was governed by a democracy.
By far the best documented of the Greek city-states, Athens was an innovator in the development of democratic institutions. By the end of the 4 th century, democratic institutions had been adopted by perhaps half of the city-states (Teegarden 2014) . In addition to its native population (ca. 30,000 adult male citizens and their families), 4 thcentury Athens supported many slaves (although estimates of numbers vary widely, 80,000 is a common estimate) and a substantial population of resident foreigners and shorter-term visitors (perhaps in the range of 30,000). Foreigners had many roles in the Athenian economy, but they were especially prominent in overseas trade. Trade was, in turn, an extremely important part of the 4 th -century Athenian economy: the city-state was not self-sufficient in grain, and a substantial part of public revenues were derived from indirect harbor taxes and from taxing the profits of trade in various indirect ways (Ober 2015b ).
The history of democratic Athens falls into three main periods: the late 6 th and early 5 th centuries, when democracy emerged in the context of elite competition and in the face of existential threats; the imperial mid-to late 5 th century; and the post-imperial 4 th century. The Athenian political system and its economy experienced a major setback at the end of the 5 th century: Athens lost the 27-year Peloponnesian War; the state survived but was stripped of its imperial possessions and navy; democratic government was replaced by an oligarchy controlled by and loyal to the victorious Spartans. The oligarchy lasted several months before a counter-revolution re-established a democratic constitution in the aftermath of a brief, but bloody civil war.
Despite the intensity of the shock, however, Athens recovered quickly. By the third quarter of the 4 th century Athens was as wealthy as ever: public infrastructure had been rebuilt; a record number of warships were ready for action; public revenues were at an all-time high; Athenian coinage was the standard form of exchange for much of the eastern Mediterranean; Piraeus, Athens' main port, was the center of a Mediterraneanwide trade. Even a defeat in 338 BCE, at the hands of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, failed to depress the thriving Athenian economy. Public documents from 325 BCE show that Athens was taking the leading role, as the preeminent Greek naval power, in efforts to suppress piracy in the Adriatic (Ober 2008: 124-133) .
Between the establishment of democracy in the late 6 th century and the collapse of democratic institutions in the year 322, Athens achieved the doorstep conditions and, in many relevant respects, transitioned to an open access society. In the next two sections, we reconstruct the steps of Athens' transition.
Athens on the doorstep
The principal hypothesis of this paper is that some part of the background prosperity of 5 th and 4 th century Greece, and specifically the exceptional performance of Before the later 6 th century BCE-that is, before the emergence of institutions capable of sustaining a democratic political order-none of the three doorstep conditions discussed by CNWW pertained in Athens, or anywhere else in the Greek world.
In this section, we discuss each doorstep condition -impersonal, perpetually lived organizations, rule of law for elites, and centralized political control over the sources of violence -in turn.
Perpetually lived organizations
In the 7 th and 6 th centuries, Athens was, like many other Greek states, plagued by chronic political instability and periodic civil unrest. An early attempt by a lawgiver (Solon, in 594 BCE) to establish something like perpetual and impersonal state institutions collapsed in the mid-sixth century with the establishment of a tyranny: the authoritarian rule of Peisistratus and his sons. The rule of the tyrants ended in a series of violent events, culminating in the Athenian Revolution of 508 BCE and the subsequent establishment of democracy (Raaflaub, Wallace, Ober 2007 ).
In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, all Athens-resident native males were declared citizens, and enrolled in ten new territorially-dispersed administrative units, conventionally called 'tribes.' Each tribe drew its membership from villages or neighborhoods in three geographically distinct parts of Athens' territory (urban, inland, coastal).
By bringing together heterogeneous groups, the post-revolutionary reforms broke down the network of regional allegiances to local big men -a system that had been responsible for much of the unrest of the previous centuries. The redistribution of Athens' citizens into the new tribes had long-lasting implications for the development of new perpetual, impersonal institutions. In what follows, we focus, in particular, on two of these: the army and the Council.
a. The army. In the sixth-century, Athens had nothing like a national army or navy (Frost 1984) . 6 After the reforms of the year 508, the army was reorganized into 10 'tribal' battalions, each battalion recruited from members of one tribe. Moreover, the army was commanded by 10 generals, elected annually by the whole of the citizenry: that is, by the native adult males of Athens, gathered in a public assembly. When, in the early 5 th century BCE, a natural resource windfall made possible the construction of a much larger navy of oared galleys, the warships were constructed at the behest of the state, the rowers were paid by the state, and the navy, like the army, was commanded by elected generals ( van Wees 2013) .
The army and navy were, in essence, the citizenry under arms -and thus the citizens annually chose the military commanders who would lead them into combat. Council set the agenda and made policy recommendations for regular meetings of the citizen assembly, reviewed magistrates before and after their term of service, and conducted much of the state's day-to-day business. The Council was, in a meaningful sense, the linchpin of Athenian government (Gomme 1951) . Designed from the beginning as a perpetual institution, the Council continued to exist throughout and past the democratic era. The impersonality of the Council was assured by the annual turnover of membership, term limits, and selection by lottery. The requirement that it be geographically representative (citizens were chosen according to tribe) ensured that it was inclusive, representative of the larger citizenry, and not dominated by territoriallybased factions and big men.
Rule of Law for Elites (and beyond)
Elite competition in Greece in the 7 th and 6 th centuries led to severe social instability and unrest, often culminating in the establishment of tyrannies. During this period, one of the most striking innovations was the introduction and the subsequent spread of written law.
Early Greek law, in Athens as elsewhere in the Greek world, was particularly concerned with imposing procedural constraints on the exercise of power (Gagarin, 1986 (Gagarin, , 2008 Harris, 2006) . In one of the earliest pieces of evidence that have come down to us from the Greek island of Crete (Dreros Code, ca. 650-600 BC), a fragmentary law specifies term limits for the (chief?) magistrate, the kosmos: "The polis has decided: when someone has been kosmos, within ten years the same person is not to be kosmos again" (Meiggs and Lewis, 1969: 2-3) . The specific concern of early Greek law with defining and limiting the power of magistrates has been rightly regarded as an effective way in which competing elites tied their own hands and credibly committed to a set of power-sharing rules (Karachalios, 2013: 193 ff.) .
During the 5 th century, the success of democracy in Athens contributed to extending the reach of the archaic elite pact to the demos as a whole. Athenian citizens gathered in the Assembly, Athens' primary decision-making body, to pass laws and policies that affected the city as a whole. The same citizens gathered in the law-courts to judge the conformity of their fellow-citizens' behavior with such laws, and to punish wrongdoing. Participation in the Assembly and in the law-courts was not restricted based on property qualifications, or birth: any adult male citizen could, and did, participate. At the same time, few constraints were imposed on the process of law-and policy-making.
Rule of law beyond the elites was most fully implemented in the 4 th century, in the aftermath of a crisis that exposed the dangers of the Assembly's unrestrained decision-making power.
In the last decade of the 5 th century, under the pressure of war, the Assembly made a series of poor military decisions that resulted in the loss of half of Athens' male population and the city's primary source of revenue (i.e. the empire). In this period, the Athenians experienced a rapid turnover of democratic and oligarchic governments.
As they struggled to restore political stability, the Athenians did not conclude that the practice of large-scale decision-making was the problem. Instead of limiting access to political institutions, (for example, by restricting the numbers of people that could participate in any given assembly, or by regulating entry more carefully), the Athenians turned to legal and constitutional reforms to rebuild democracy on a firmer basis.
As part of these reforms, the Athenians decentralized the decision-making process by establishing an additional legislative institution (the nomothetai, lit. lawmakers) to check the power of the Assembly and carefully defined the relative sphere of influence of the two legislative bodies.
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The late 5 th century shock upset not only the polis' democratic equilibrium, but also its economic structure. In post-imperial Athens, a crucial challenge was to find new sources of wealth-creation and state revenues. Once again, the polis' reaction was to extend, rather than curtail inclusion: to raise revenues, Athens turned to its non-citizen population, bestowing on them honors and privileges in exchange for much needed taxable economic activity, especially in the sphere of long-distance maritime trade. Of particular note was the establishment of new tribunals (known as dikai emporikai) for the resolution of commercial disputes in which non-citizens (including foreigners and slaves) enjoyed legal standing.
Consolidated, political control over the sources of violence
The Athenian attitude toward consolidating control over the sources of violence offers critical insights to understand Athens' peculiar path to development, and how such a path differed from that of modern developed countries.
Whereas the Athenians established central control of the military in the form of an impersonal, perpetual and inclusive army very early on, the polis never established 7 On the new democratic constitution and accompanying legal reforms see Carawan, 2013; Carugati, 2015. consolidated, political control over the sources of domestic (that is, social) violence. Most notably, Athens lacked an organized police force, public prosecutors, and expert judges and lawyers to articulate the content of legal norms; to apply the law to specific cases (for example, through comprehensive law codes or detailed judicial opinions); to detect wrongdoing; and to enforce judgments (Lanni, 2006; Carugati, Hadfield, and Weingast, 2015) .
We might interpret the lack of such institutions as a failure on the part of Athensa failure that reveals Athens' inability to fully meet the conditions of open access, or even the doorstep conditions. Yet, the lack of institutions that we normally associate with the establishment and maintenance of social order in modern liberal democracies did not prevent Athens from achieving the public goods that we associate with modern institutions, including high and sustained levels of order, stability, and peace (Herman 2006; Lanni, 2009 ).
Understanding the sources of Athens' social order, then, is key to appreciating the contribution of the ancient polis to expanding our understanding of open access and, with it, the process and aims of development in modern developing countries.
Unlike modern, centralized, liberal democracies, Athens was able to control social violence leaving vast areas of law and norm enforcement in the hands of private individuals. 8 Throughout the classical period, apprehension of wrongdoers, investigation of cases, prosecution, and enforcement of judicial decisions remained the responsibility 8 Here, a distinction ought to be drawn between the 'centralized' law-making institutions (i.e., the Assembly and the law-courts), which elaborated the content of laws and norms and passed judgments on individual cases, and the sphere of enforcement, which was thoroughly decentralized. Another distinction worthy of note concerns the degree of centralization: whereas in most modern countries the elaboration and application of norms and laws is the purview of a relatively small cadre of 'experts,' in Athens these tasks were carried out by large swaths of the lay population. For a detailed overview of Athens' complex judicial system see Carugati, 2015; Carugati, Hadfield and Weingast, 2015. of the individual litigant (Hunter, 1994) . This arrangement was no 'mistake:' although Athens was very active in the field of legal reforms (particularly throughout the years 413-403), no attempts were made to curtail the power of the individual citizen to seek redress through the formal legal system. Private initiative within the formal legal system, as well as informal self-help and extra-judicial, 'popular' forms of redress, remained part and parcel of the Athenian approach to law and order (Hunter, 1994; Cohen, 1991; , Forsdyke, 2012 .
The absence of strongly centralized institutions for the application and Athens' formal court helped coordinate citizens' (and, to some extent, noncitizens') expectations about the content of laws and norms by formulating and publicizing common knowledge assessments about what constituted wrongdoing and how deviation from the rules ought to be punished (Lanni, 2009; Carugati, Hadfield and Weingast, 2015, Carugati, 2015; Carugati and Weingast, in progress, a and b) .
Athens' formal courts also helped secure incentive-compatibility for punishers in a largely decentralized and voluntary system of coercion. The large size, representative composition, and distinctive procedural rules of the formal courts (including the lax rules of relevance, the absence of deliberation, secret ballot, and majority rule) produced rules that applied to all regardless of their identity, that catered to all regardless of their idiosyncratic attitudes toward wrongdoing (to the extent that this was possible) and, most importantly, that all regarded as authoritative. 9 Individual, voluntary participation in law enforcement was the pillar of a democratic way of life, and democracy's foremost bastion; it was powerfully inculcated into the minds of the Athenians through widespread participation (as litigants, jurors, and bystanders) in courts and by legal oratory.
Athens' formal courts thus presided over a stable but largely decentralized legal system that provided a) security against arbitrary acts of violence perpetrated by Athenian officials as well as, as we will see in the next section, lay citizens and non-citizens, and b) predictability, provided by reasonably fair rules and their reasonably impartial application and reliable enforcement.
Athens thus departed from the model of the modern, centralized, liberal democratic state in some significant ways. First, lacking a centralized bureaucracy, a professional standing army, and an organized police force, Athens achieved and sustained order, stability, and peace by building a legal system that paid primary attention to securing common knowledge of rules and incentive compatibility for (decentralized, voluntary) enforcers. In the absence of strong centralization, Athens' legal system also provided security and predictability without compromising its ability to produce critical public goods, and to distribute reasonably abundant material goods to the majority of the population in a reasonably fair manner. 10 9 Carugati, Hadfield and Weingast (2015) contend that Athenian courts met the incentive-compatibility constraint because their judgments presented the following features: qualified universality (that is, the laws apply to all on which enforcement efforts depend); impersonal, neutral and independent reasoning (that is, the law reflected common community expectations and was largely immune to systematic bias and corruption); and openness (that is, court judgments took into account a variety of informal norms and formal laws which increased the likelihood that individual assessments of wrongdoing would coincide, or substantially overlap, with those of the jury.) 10 We discuss public goods provision in the next section.
Opening access at Athens
In In the area of criminal law, the Athenians criminalized acts of hubris: that is, the willful humiliation of one individual by another by deed or word. The law was employed to ensure the defense of individual citizens' civic dignity, and thereby the equality of high standing among participatory citizens. Ensuring this defense was essential if Athenians were to govern themselves democratically and if powerful elites were to be prevented from preying upon non-elites (Ober 2012) . The hubris law is, however, remarkable in that it explicitly extended the ambit of legal immunity, beyond the ranks of participatory citizens, impersonally, to all residents of Athens, whether free or slave, male or female, adult or child. Citizens retained a monopoly on the right to initiate a criminal charge of hubris, but the law's protection was not limited to citizens. Cited in legal testimony, the broad scope of protection offered to non-citizens (Demosthenes speech 21: Against Meidias; Ober 2000) points to Athenian self-consciousness about their own achievement in opening access to important legal immunities to non-elites.
In the mid 4 th century BCE, the section of the Athenian law code regulating enforcement of contracts for overseas trade was revised in ways that substantially opened access to legal institutions to non-Athenians. The reform leveled, at least in principle, the legal playing field between citizens and non-citizens in contract disputes (Cohen 1973 , Lanni 2006 ). In the restructured 'commercial cases' (dikai emporikai), the procedural rules now limited the legitimate basis of judicial judgment to the question of whether the terms of a written contract had been violated. This reform substantially reduced the discretion of the jurors (who remained Athenian citizens) to judge on the basis of arguments about litigants' origins, character, or their histories of public generosity or private misbehavior. Most importantly, contract violation cases could be initiated by noncitizens as well as citizens: certainly by free foreigners and probably by slaves, some of whom worked in banks and engaged in large scale financial transactions (Cohen 1992 ).
Meanwhile, the Athenian state elaborated its system of market regulation in ways that tended to lower information asymmetries between buyers and sellers in the Athenian marketplace. Notable among institutional innovations was establishment of public "Approvers" of silver coinage. Athens, like most classical Greek states, minted silver coins in standard denominations -Athenian coins were nicknamed 'owls,' after the image of an owl stamped on each coin's reverse. Because of the great popularity of Athenian owls as a means of exchange in eastern Mediterranean markets, the coins were widely counterfeited (van Alfen 2005) . The Athenian Approvers were publicly-provided market officials charged with detecting counterfeits. Sellers in the market offering goods in exchange for silver could demand that buyers present their coins to the Approver (whose office was located in the center of the market) before concluding the sale. 'Bad' counterfeits (coins with sub-standard silver content) were confiscated; good' counterfeits (correct weight and purity, but minted outside Athens) were returned to the buyer; and coins issued by the Athenian mint were 'approved' -meaning that their acceptance by the seller was mandatory. The publicly displayed law governing the approval procedure makes it clear that the service was freely available to all traders in Athenian markets: to citizens, foreigners, and slaves alike (Stroud 1974 , Ober 2008 . Athens had a rich infrastructure of civil associations, some of which performed important civic functions (Ismard 2010 , Kierstead 2013 . By the later 5 th century, and continuing through the 4 th century, associations of foreigners in Athens were granted official, perpetual charters that provided them with public land on which they could construct their own sanctuaries and where they were free to practice their religion as they pleased.
An official document from 333 BCE records a state land-grant to a group of Athensresident merchants from Citium on Cyprus for a sanctuary to be dedicated to Cyprian
Aphrodite "just as also the Egyptians have built the sanctuary of Isis" (Ober 2008: 252) .
The mention in the document of the Egyptian Isis sanctuary as a precedent (evidently a recent one) suggests that the religious land grants were part of a recognized state policy.
Open access also applied to ideas, including ideas used to criticize the state. The establishment of philosophical schools (for example, those of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle, which typically included both citizens and non-citizens among their memberships) at once provides an example of open access in ideas as well as another well-documented example of the formation of perpetual and formal non-state associations (Kierstead 2013) . 11 These schools were formal associations, with their own internal bylaws and elected officials (Lynch 1972) . State toleration of the philosophical schools is especially noteworthy given the highly critical stance toward democracy taken by their founders (Ober 1998).
Explaining open access at Athens
As Kierstead (2013) elites (notably in large-scale naval operations) ensured that all Athenians had an opportunity for predatory enrichment (Finley 1978) .
Athens lost the empire in the course of the long Peloponnesian War, which was followed by a brief, fierce, civil war. Although the masses won the civil war, the aftermath of not characterized by episodes of retaliation against the elite losers. Instead, the victorious many declared an Amnesty and completed constitutional reforms that defined the procedural conditions for the reestablishment of social order under a new democratic government, notably the principle of coordination among institutions in the process of lawmaking and the development of constitutional safeguards to protect the democracy against extra-constitutional action (Carugati, 2015) . The post-civil-war legal pact was made in the recognition that, in the face of threats from powerful rivals (Thebes and Sparta), continued civil strife would leave Athens vulnerable. The Athenians also recognized that, having lost the empire, neither the democracy nor economic growth could be sustained without substantially increasing state revenues from other sources.
The most obvious, and least contentious, source of revenue was indirect taxation:
maximizing the volume of trade helped lower the threat of violence in the immediate aftermath of civil conflict by raising the cost of fighting. Maximizing the volume of trade also motivated the decision by the citizens to expand access to relevant institutions in ways that would be attractive to non-citizen traders.
Part of the explanation for Athens' transition to open access can, therefore, be attributed to two interrelated conditions: first, the political sociology of the citizen bodythe fact that powerful elites and ordinary citizens shared in the regime -and next, the fiscal requirements of democracy.
After 508 BCE, all adult male natives were citizens of Athens, with full civic rights (to vote, serve on juries, hold most public offices) regardless of their possession, or lack, of property. Compared to other pre-modern societies, Athenian income inequality was quite limited (Gini coefficient = ca. 0.40-0.45: Ober 2015a; comparisons: Milanovic, Lindert, and Williamson 2011) . Real wages at Athens were surprisingly high by premodern standards (Scheidel 2010) , and the state provided some features of a welfare 'safety net' (Ober 2008 ).
Yet, as the ancient sources suggest, some Athenians were much wealthier than others. In Athens, as in other societies ancient and modern, relative poverty was associated with weakness and vulnerability. The vulnerability of relatively poor citizens was particularly problematic in a large participatory democracy: had the system tolerated systematic bullying or over-awing of the weak at the hands of the elite, political liberty and equality-the very basis of the democratic order-would have been compromised.
The law forbidding hubris, cited above (section 5) may therefore be explained, at least in part, by reference to Athenian democratic concern for protecting the civic standing of the weakest citizens. The working poor of Athens were not readily distinguished from foreigners or even from slaves (as the Athenian writer known as the 'Old Oligarch,' writing in the late 5 th century, contemptuously notes). 12 The wives and children of non-elite citizens would often have worked at occupations that exposed them to the view of, and potentially to the mistreatment by, the powerful. If arrogant elites developed the habit of humiliating foreigners, slaves, women, or children, those habits might eventually reduce the poor working man to a condition in which he could not readily fulfill the role of a participatory citizen in a democratic community. The antihubris law, therefore, supported specific political considerations with the protection of the equal high standing of citizens that was necessary to maintain democracy (Ober 2000 (Ober , 2012 . Athens' recovery after the breakdown of democracy and the loss of the polis' major source of revenue was, against all odds, fast and solid: after its reestablishment, the democracy was stable throughout the period in question; fortifications, dockyards, and warships were quickly rebuilt; important new public buildings were erected; the 'safety-net' of government-supported social welfare was expanded (Ober, 2008; Carugati 2015) .
Where did Athens find the money to fund its recovery?
The 4 th century Athenian state raised revenues from various sources, but indirect taxes on trade were, by all accounts, especially important (Ober, 2015b; Pritchard 2012 , Lyttkens 2012 . Institutional innovations appear to be essential in ensuring that trade remained robust and thus that taxes on trade could sustain essential state services. Athens benefitted from an exceptionally fine natural harbor at Piraeus, but the long history of
Piraeus from the archaic period through early modernity shows that the harbor was often a backwater. Clearly a good location alone was insufficient to generate flourishing trade; the right sort of state intervention was necessary in order for Piraeus to be the center of Aegean trade (Carugati, 2015, ch. 2) . A number of the 4 th century access-opening innovations of the Athenian state, which we discussed above (section 5), were directly beneficial to the purpose of encouraging trade, particularly the legal reform of commercial cases, the land-grants to foreign traders' religious sanctuaries, and the establishment of the Approvers of silver coins. These reforms reduced information asymmetries, assured equitable access to valuable public institutions, and lowered transaction costs for all persons involved in exchanges in Athenian markets. 
Conclusions
Is development a phenomenon uniquely found in modernity? In this article, we deploy the case of ancient Athens to make a twofold contribution to the literature on development.
First, we reject theories of development that rest on the argument that development depends on conditions unique to modernity, such as high GDP growth, liberal democracy, and strongly centralized government. These theories are based on a circular logic that excludes the possibility of pre-modern development a priori. Based on the experience of a handful of modern developed countries, current models of development tend to obscure intuitively relevant distinctions among pre-modern states, as well as intuitively relevant distinctions between certain pre-modern and certain modern states.
Second, we provide an alternative definition of development as the ability of a state to provide security, stability, and predictability via the establishment of reasonably fair rules, and their consistent application and enforcement. However, at least in modernity and in the relatively short run, democratic institutions are not the only way, as cases like Singapore illustrate. Our investigation suggests that the key to development is to sustain provision of security and predictability not only in times of peace, but especially during periods of crisis. Whether non-democratic institutions can sustain this challenge, however, is not answered by the case of Singapore.
While we do not postulate democracy as an outcome of development, we show through the case of ancient Athens that development without liberal democracy can include a good deal of 'democratic order,' as defined by security and predictability, in the absence of strong centralization and yet achieve high levels of economic growth.
